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HOUSING SYMPOSIUM
THE CLEVELAND HOUSING COURT ACT:
NEW ANSWER TO AN OLD PROBLEM
FREDERIC P. WHITE*
"What we want is a housing court that works, and not one that is
as indecisive, inefficient and interminable as the present one.. 
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE OPERATIONS OF THE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL HOUSING COURT
commenced April 2, 1980. The Housing Court, a division of the
Cleveland Municipal Court system, was established to resolve all
housing-related disputes. While considered by some as a welcome solu-
tion to overcrowded court dockets, others view it as simply another un-
necessary cog in an already overburdened bureaucratic wheel. Close ex-
amination indicates, however, that there is a serious question as to
whether this specialized judicial division is in fact meeting its intended
purpose.
This Article will critically examine the Housing Court's historical set-
ting, constitutional foundation and jurisdictional powers. In addition,
comparison with systems established in other states provides possible
alternative suggestions for successful operation. Finally, an in-depth
analysis of current problems, including inadequate funds and staff,
political manipulation and protracted procedural delays, seeks to
answer the question of whether the Housing Court will become a mean-
ingful and positive force for change, or simply an "indecisive, inefficient
and interminable" 2 bureaucratic nightmare.3
* B.A., Columbia College; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; Assis-
tant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law.
' Andrzejewski, The Plain Dealer, Feb. 24, 1980, A25, col. 2, at A35, col. 4
(quoting Norman Krumholz, former Cleveland City Planning and Community
Development Director. Krumholz, who headed a task force to establish the Hous-
ing Court's operations, was referring to the manner in which cases were handled
in the Cleveland Municipal Court prior to the establishment of the Housing
Court.)
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.011 (Page Supp. 1980).
1 See note 1 supra. Opinions about the relative merits of the Housing Court
vary. For instance, "Advocates of the housing court believe one judge handling
all the building and housing code cases, as well as landlord-tenant cases, would
bring continuity and expertise to housing cases, and his staff would be able to
round out a housing strategy to complement other city programs .. " Quoted
from Cloud Hangs Over Housing Court Already, The Plain Dealer, Feb. 24, 1980,
A35, col. 5.
Several cities have established a special housing court, usually a term or
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II. HISTORICAL SETTING FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HOUSING COURT
A. The Housing Problem
Over thirty years ago, Congress, in recognition of the magnitude of
our nation's housing dilemma, passed the Housing Act of 1949,' seeking
to reach the goal of a "decent home and suitable living environment for
every American Family."' Twenty years later the housing problem re-
mained unresolved, and in 1968 a special Presidential Committee
observed:
There is an immediate and critical social need for millions of
decent dwellings to shelter the nation's lower-income families.
Overlying this need is one raising an unprecedented and chal-
lenging production problem. The nation is heading toward a seri-
ous shortage of housing for the total population, unless produc-
tion is sharply increased.'
It is this very shortage of adequate housing that has filled the courts
with an excessive number of cases arising out of dissatisfied property
owners, tenants and local government officials.
Cleveland has not escaped this national crisis, nor the extra burden
placed upon the judiciary as a result. Significantly, the Landlord-Tenant
Act' appears to be a boon to raising some of these sub-standard living
conditions, yet the ultimate effect has been increased litigation which
has added to the back-log in the court. The findings of a twelve month
survey conducted during 1967-68 revealed that "there are over 43,743
dwelling units in Cleveland's file pending action. . . . This figure
represents housing units in which people are living in conditions where
even the minimal standards for the protection of their health, safety and
welfare are not being met."'
part of a municipal criminal court. Judges are generally assigned for
periods varying from six weeks to one year. In theory, a housing court
judge should become familiar with enforcement policies, the meaning of
code provisions, the efficacy of available sanctions, and the identity of
flagrant violators. Five judges who sat on the Baltimore Housing Court
estimated that it took at least six months to understand the complexities
of code enforcement, so that even a year's assignment seems too short.
Yet it may be impossible to extend the period because the Housing
Court is often considered an undesirable assignment. To make a long
term more palatable, housing cases might be divided among several
judges, none hearing housing cases exclusively ....
Note, Enforcement of Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 881 (1965).
Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 111 1979).
T. LORD, DECENT HOUSING: A PROMISE TO KEEP 10 (1977).
6 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT
HOME 8 (1969).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01-.19 (Page 1981).
8 Marco & Macino, Housing Code Enforcement-A New Approach, 18 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 368, 369-70 (1969).
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Due to city budget constraints and limited federal subsidies, current
housing facilities remain inadequate, even though the Cleveland popula-
tion has dropped substantially since 1969. Consequently, as in other
cities across the country, these inadequacies are unlikely to be abated,
thus increasing the need for a special judicial division.
B. Development of the Housing Court
Housing courts have generally developed as attempts to cure dissatis-
faction with the handling of serious housing problems.' Presently,
several cities have instituted a separate judicial branch to resolve hous-
ing disputes.'" In addition, more of these specialty courts are in the plan-
ning stages."
These housing courts are based on varying models. Some handle only
code enforcement," while others are limited to summary proceedings
such as evictions.'3 Many, including the Cleveland Housing Court, are
I See generally Scott, Housing Courts and Housing Justice: An Overview, 17
URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979).
'0 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-68 (West 1981) (Hartford); IND. STAT. ANN. §
33-6-1-2(b) (Burns 1976) (Indianapolis); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 185C (West Supp.
1979) (Boston); N.Y. CITY SERV. LAW § 110 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (New York);
N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 1-554 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (various municipalities);
PITTSBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE § 375 (Aug. 7, 1967).
" See note 9 supra.
" Buffalo, Indianapolis and Pittsburgh all have examples of this type of court.
See generally Comay, The City of Pittsburgh Housing Court, 30 U. PITT. L. REV.
459 (1969); Jesten, The Indianapolis Environmental Court, 17 URB. L. ANN. 209
(1979); LoRusso, The Buffalo Housing Court: A Special Court for Special Prob-
lems, 17 URB. L. ANN. 199 (1979). In addition, both Detroit and Minneapolis pro-
vide for code enforcement activities under their versions of Housing Courts.
These two jurisdictions, however, also provide mechanisms for activities other
than code enforcement. See generally Dick & Pfarr, Detroit Housing Code En-
forcement and Community Renewal A Study in Futility, 3 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 61
(1969); Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule
Results: A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 9 (1973);
Penkower, The Housing Court of Pittsburgh, 17 URB. L. ANN. 141 (1979); Reed,
Detroit Code Enforcement and the Housing Court Debate, 17 URB. L. ANN. 215
(1979); Rogers, An Alternative to a Housing Court, 17 URB. L. ANN. 177 (1979);
Rose & Scott, "Street Talk" Summonses in Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court: A
Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967 (1975).
'" Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., operate along these lines.
Each has a specialized court which is either set up exclusively for "eviction," an
"unlawful detainer" action or, because of crowded dockets, has merely evolved in-
to this type of court. See generally ABA, HOUSING JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE AND INNOVATION IN OUR COURTS (R.
Scott, ed., 1980); Epstein, The Los Angeles Landlord-Tenant Court, 17 URB. L.
ANN. 161 (1979); Fusco, Collins & Birnbaum, Chicago's Eviction Court: A Tenants'
Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93 (1979); McNamara, The District of Colum-
bia Landlord and Tenant Court: An Obsolete Structure in Need of Reform, 23
CATH. U. L. REV. 275 (1973); Nebron & Epstein, Landlord Tenant Court in Los
Angeles: Restructuring the Justice System, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537 (1978); Roth-
stein, The Chicago Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 133 (1979).
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more comprehensive and deal with code enforcement and evictions, as
well as related matters. 4
III. RECONCILING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HOUSING
COURT ACT WITH THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
Article II, Section 26 of the Ohio Constitution mandates that: "All
laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the
state. . . ."" Any possible conflict between this requirement and a
statute creating a housing division for only one city's municipal court
system has long been resolved. There are two bases upon which this
conclusion rests. First, courts are reluctant to find laws unconstitutional
as a matter of law. More importantly, the Housing Court Act is con-
sidered an exception to the uniform requirement of Article II, Section
26, since municipal courts operate under special rather than general
grants of legislative power.
It is clear that the General Assembly has the power to create inferior
courts. 6 In addition, the General Assembly may define the jurisdiction
and procedure to be followed by such courts.17 Whether all such con-
stitutionally mandated, statutorily created, inferior courts are of a
"general nature" is another question.
In Miller v. Eagle,8 the court, following State v. Block, 9 reconciled
any possible constitutional conflict:
" See generally Cohen, The New York City Housing Court-An Evolution,
17 URB. L. ANN. 27 (1979); Garrity, The Boston Housing Court: An Encouraging
Response to Complex Issues, 17 URB. L. ANN. 15 (1979); Goodman, Housing
Court: The New York Tenant Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 57 (1979); Greaney,
County Housing Court, 8 J. HOUSING 402 (1975); Peck, The Hampden County
Housing Court: An Overview, 17 URB. L. ANN. 65 (1979); Rutzick & Huffman, The
New York City Housing Court: Trial and Error in Housing Code Enforcement, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (1975); Spada, The Hartford-New Britain Judicial District
Housing Court, 17 URB. L. ANN. 187 (1979); Walsh, Housing Code Enforcement in
New York City-Another Look at an Administrative Tribunal, 17 URB. L. ANN.
51 (1979); Comment, The New York City Housing Court: New Remedy for an Old
Dilemma, 3 FORD. URB. L.J. 267 (1975).
Since the Massachusetts, New York City arid Hartford-New Britain housing
courts are similar to Cleveland's system in approach and structure, they will be
compared and contrasted in Part V of this article. See notes 30-54 infra and ac-
companying text. Although theoretically Detroit and Minneapolis have similar
structures and difficulties, these housing court systems will not be discussed
because their operations are not administered through a unified court.
15 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.
16 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; art. IV, § 1. See State ex rel Stanley v. Bernon, 127
Ohio St. 204, 187 N.E. 733 (1933); State ex rel Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St. 596,
165 N.E. 298 (1929); Ohio ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Bloch, 65 Ohio St. 370, 62 N.E. 441
(1901).
17 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 15. See State ex rel. Ramey v. Davis, 119 Ohio St.
596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929).
's 96 Ohio St. 106, 117 N.E. 23 (1917).
19 65 Ohio St. 370, 62 N.E. 441 (1901).
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[Slection one, Article four of the Constitution, authorizing the es-
tablishment by the General Assembly of inferior courts, was a
special grant of legislative power upon a particular subject,
which itself prescribed the rule for the government of the legis-
lative body in the exercise of that power .... [T]he General As-
sembly is vested with full power to determine what courts, in-
ferior to the Court of Appeals it will establish .... and to define
their jurisdiction and power, and in the enactment of laws relat-
ing thereto is not subject to the limitation imposed upon the
legislative power in requiring all laws of a general nature to
have uniform operation throughout the state. 0
There is, therefore, no constitutional basis for an attack against the
Housing Division of the Cleveland Municipal Court. The court is
established pursuant to the special grant of legislative power to create
inferior courts provided under Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Con-
stitution, and, as such, is beyond the reach of Article II, Section 26 of
the Ohio Constitution. Hence, if the Housing Court has any potential
problems, they would appear to emanate from within its internal struc-
ture.
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE HOUSING COURT
The Cleveland "Housing Court Act," which created a housing division
within the Cleveland Municipal Court system," became effective April
2, 1980.22 Under the Act this division is granted exclusive jurisdiction in
any criminal or civil action to enforce local building, housing, air pollu-
tion, sanitation, health, fire or safety codes.23
20 96 Ohio St. at 117, 117 N.E. at 25 (emphasis added).
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.011 (Page Supp. 1980).
2 The bill was forwarded to Governor Rhodes on November 30, 1979, and was
"not signed or returned to the Senate wherein it originated within ten days after
being so presented" and, therefore, became effective automatically. OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 16. The Act amends §§ 1901.14, 1901.18, 1901.19 and 1901.36, and enacts§§ 1901.011, 1901.025, 1901.031, 1901.041, 1901.051, 1901.181 and 1901.331. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1901 (Page Supp. 1980).
23 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.181(A) (Page Supp. 1980). Theoretically, the
Housing Court has the power to decide disputes based on the following City of
Cleveland laws discussed herein below.
The Health Code is directed against nuisances and, as such, regulates such
problems as weeds, air pollution, vacant lands and vermin and rodent infestation.
The nuisance abatement provisions of the Health Code are enforced by the Com-
missioner of Environmental Health, whereas the air pollution control provisions
are enforced by the Commissioner of Air Pollution Control under the supervision
and direction of the Director of Public Health and Welfare. CLEV., OHIO, PART
TWO-HEALTH CODE (1978).
The Public and Private Land Use Regulations Code is primarily directed at
violations of the zoning, housing, fire prevention and building laws. CLEV., OHIO,
PART THREE-HEALTH CODE (1978). The Zoning Code, Title Seven of this Part,
designates and regulates various types of use districts. The Code is enforced by
the Divisions of Building and Housing under the direction of their respective com-
1981]
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The Housing Court also has power to hear and determine all legal and
equitable remedies24 and to adopt and publish its own civil and criminal
rules of procedure." In addition, the Administrative Judge of the
Cleveland Municipal Court has authority to transfer cases from other
courts in the Municipal Court system to the Housing Court."R
The Act provides the Housing Court with "one full-time judge" who
"shall be elected specifically as the Housing Division Judge," a "Chief
Housing Specialist, housing specialists and other employees."2 The
general duties of the Housing Specialist include visiting premises to ex-
amine the extent of needed repairs, interviewing owners and tenants to
ascertain what can be done to effect such repairs and, from time to time,
revisiting the property to examine the progress for work being done.
Primary duties of the specialist, however, consist of steering
homeowners to various loan and grant programs to secure funds for
necessary repairs.28
missioners. Appeals from determinations of these commissioners are handled by
the Board of Zoning Appeals.
The Housing Code, Title Nine of this Part, establishes standards and
regulates residences, rental dwellings and rooming houses, and is enforced by the
Commissioner of Housing. Appeals from the commissioner are referred to the
Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals or the Board of Zoning Ap-
peals.
The Fire Prevention Code, Title Eleven of this Part, regulates flammable liq-
uids, flammable materials and grease, explosives, fire extinguishing equipment
and fire alarm and detection systems. The Fire Chief and such members of the
Fire Division as are designated by him are in charge of enforcement and, except
in emergencies, appeals from abatement orders are made directly to the Board of
Building Standards and Building Appeals.
The Building Code is the most comprehensive of the housing-related legisla-
tion in Cleveland and regulates such diverse items as permits and occupancy cer-
tificates, outdoor signs and displays, residential occupancy, light and ventilation,
heating, ventilation and air conditioning, plumbing and electrical wiring. Enforce-
ment is through the Commissioner of Buildings, and appeals are heard by the
Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals.
Examination of forcible entry and detainer (chapter 1923), landlord-tenant law
(chapter 5321) and land installment contracts (chapter 5313) is beyond the scope
of this article. For further information about these actions see Baillis, Ohio
Landlord-Tenant Act of 1974, 3 OHIO N. L. REV. 122 (1975); Haley, Landlord-
Tenant Reform in Ohio, 2 N. KY. ST. L.F. 212 (1975); Note, Reformation of the
Landlord-Tenant Relationship in Ohio, 4 CAP. U. L. REV. 258 (1975); Note,
Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 393 (1972);
Note, Covenant of Habitability and the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation, 23
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539 (1974); Note, Forcibly Ejected Tenant-Damages, Posses-
sions, Both or Nothing?, 28 U. CIN. L, REV. 369 (1959).
?A OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.031 (Page Supp. 1980).
25 Id. §§ 1901.14(B),(C).
Id. § 1901.041.
Id. § 1901.051.
There are currently three such programs: CASH, NHS and the 3% Home
Loan Program. CASH is a non-profit organization consisting of the City of
[Vol. 30:41
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Although theoretically the Housing Court has broad jurisdiction over
various housing, health and safety issues, as a practical matter most
cases involve only evictions.2 9 It is hoped that in the future the activities
of the Housing Specialist will help to increase the scope of matters
handled by the court, and enable this special judiciary to play a greater
role in the improvement of inadequate housing.
V. COMPARISON OF THE CLEVELAND HOUSING DIVISION
WITH OTHER HOUSING COURTS
Many jurisdictions possess special judicial machinery designed to
alleviate housing-related problems. Because each jurisdiction has a par-
ticular philosophy concerning the eradication of its housing problems, at-
tempting to compare the various and diverse approaches is, at best, a
Cleveland acting in combination with various Cleveland-area financial institu-
tions. Its purpose is to make rehabilitiation loans and grants to Cleveland
residents living in so-called Community Development Neighborhood Strategy
Areas who wish to bring their homes into compliance with City of Cleveland
Housing and Building Codes. Funds are supplied to CASH through the pooling of
City of Cleveland Community Block Grant monies with funds from the par-
ticipating financial institutions. CASH has no income limits for its applicants;
rather, loans and grants are based on an applicant's disposable income. CASH
loan and grant recipients receive funds through one or more of the following
sources: (1) city loans at the current annual interest rate; (2) interest-free defer-
red loans from the city placed as a lien on the property, payable only when the ti-
tle to the property is transferred; (3) bank loans at the current annual interest
rate; and (4) deferred loan/grants in combination with any of the above,
depreciating to zero over an eight-year period and becoming a grant.
Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS) is a private, nonprofit corporation
formed by city residents and various Cleveland-area financial institutions. NHS
has two designated "service areas" for the east and the west side of Cleveland.
Regardless of income, residents of these services areas are eligible for rehabilita-
tion loans. For residents who are eligible for traditional bank loans, NHS will
assist them in the loan application process. For those residents who are not eligi-
ble for bank loans, NHS considers making loans directly to the residents from its
so-called "revolving fund." The money for this fund is provided by local founda-
tions and the Urban Reinvestment Task Force. Loan funds are used to bring
homes located within the service areas into compliance with City of Cleveland
Housing and Building Codes.
The City of Cleveland administers a combination of 3% loan and grant/de-
ferred loan program for residents of certain designated areas of the city. Eligibil-
ity for loan funds is based on the applicant's ability to pay. Maximum amounts to
be transferred to applicants currently are the following: (1) grants, $4,000; (2)
grants and deferred loans, $18,500; (3) deferred loans, $18,500; and (4) 3% loans,
from $27,000 (1 unit) to $36,000 (4 units). The program only pays for those items
which are determined by a Rehabilitation Advisor to be current or prospective
code violations.
On April 1, 1980, prior to the inception of the Housing Court, there were
113 housing code violations and 1,578 forcible entry and detainers pending. Since
establishment of the special court, new cases filed between April 1 and October
30, 1980, total 525 housing violations and 5,323 forcible entry and detainers.
19811
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difficult task. Three jurisdictions, Hartford," Boston' and New York32
do, however, have systems similar to Cleveland's so as to provide mean-
ingful comparisons. The wording of the Housing Court Act is substan-
tially similar to that of these other Housing Acts. There are some impor-
tant differences. For example, the Cleveland Housing Court Act pro-
vides that the "judges of the Housing Division of a Municipal Court may
adopt, publish and revise rules"33 for the administration of the Housing
Court. But the Court presently consists of only one judge.34 Therefore,
although the rules are made by the Housing Court, they are in effect
made by only one person. Similarly, the Massachusetts Act provides
that the "senior justice in time of service shall be the first justice of [his]
division." 35 This justice is deemed to be the Administrative Head3 who
has the authority to make the general rules and forms of procedure for
the department. 7 In contrast, the Connecticut Housing Court is part of
the Connecticut Superior Court.' Rules of the New York City Housing
Court, a division of the New York City Civil Court, are promulgated in a
fashion similar to that of the Connecticut Court. 9
There is also disparity among these courts regarding the attainment
of judicial office. Unlike the Cleveland and New York systems, both the
Massachusetts and Connecticut Acts provide for the appointment, not
'* CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-68 (West Supp. 1981). The Hartford-New Bri-
tain Judicial District Housing Court (the "Connecticut Act") was passed by the
Connecticut General Assembly in 1978.
1 The "Massachusetts Act," MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 185(c), §§ 1-23
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981), was enacted on July 18, 1978. This act is an
almost literal redrafting of the two pieces of legislation which established the
Boston Housing Court and Hampden County Housing Court. Both statutes
establishing these courts have since been repealed by MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 478,
§ 91 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
32 CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 110 (McKinney Supp. 1981). New York's Housing Court
became a reality by the addition of Section 110 to the New York City Civil Court
Act (the "New York Act").
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.14(C) (Page Supp. 1980).
Id. § 1901.051.
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 185(c), § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
Id § 8(A).
Id. § 7. Allowing one justice to make the rules is not important until either
the justices grow in number and, therefore, have a wider variety of opinions with
regard to the scope of the rules, or until the present method becomes inadequate
to serve the court's purpose.
'8 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47(a)-74 (West Supp. 1981). Since, according to
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-165 (West Supp. 1981), there are over one hundred
Superior Court judges, it is likely that the judges assigned by the state Chief
Court Administrator to hearing housing-related matters promulgate the Connec-
ticut Housing Court's rules of practice and procedure.
39 N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 19(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 30:41
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election, of judicial officers."' Also, the Massachusetts and the Connec-
ticut Acts provide for the appointment of Housing Specialists whose
duties are identical to those of the Housing Specialists appointed pur-
suant to the terms of the Cleveland Housing Court Act."' The New York
Act provides for "pro se clerks" whose duties appear to be similar to,
but not as all-encompassing as those of the Housing Specialists. 2
There remains, however, a more important consideration in the com-
parison of the various housing court systems: that of the scope of the
courts' powers. Traditionally, housing or landlord-tenant courts have
been looked upon as lightweight, inferior courts, or close to, but not
quite the same as small claims courts. 3 Presumably to combat this
perception, the Massachusetts Act provides that "the divisions of the
housing court department shall have superior and general jurisdiction
with reference to all cases and matters within their jurisdiction."" In
Massachusetts, courts endowed with this superior and general jurisdic-
tion are more on a par with the Ohio courts of common pleas than with
municipal courts, as they have some appellate jurisdiction. 5 In addition,
the Massachusetts Act not only provides the Housing Court Depart-
ment with jurisdiction over housing code enforcement, but also over any
crimes which might occur on the premises during the performance of
code enforcement duties.'" Thus, for example if a housing inspector is
"0 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-42 (West Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch.
185(c), § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). Connecticut judges are appointed for
eight year terms by the General Assembly. Massachusetts judges are appointed
for life by the General Assembly. New York City Civil Court judges are elected
for ten year terms; the Criminal Court judges in the unified Civil-Criminal Court
system are appointed by the Mayor for ten year terms. Some of the New York
judicial officers in the Civil Court, the housing judges, are appointed by the
court's administrative judge. Their status seems to be akin to that of a referee.
See CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 110(e)(f), (i) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
There are also differences regarding the number of housing court judges a
particular court may have. Under the Connecticut Act the state's Chief Court
Administrator appoints one housing judge from the ranks of Superior Court
Branch. See Spada, The Hartford-New Britain Judicial District Housing Court,
17 URB. L. ANN. 187, 187-88 (1979). The Massachusetts Act further provides for
the appointment of three justices: one for the Hampton County Housing Court
Division and two for the City of Boston Housing Court Division. See MASS. ANN.
LAWS. ch. 289(c), § 8 (MichiefLaw. Co-op Supp. 1981).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-69 (West Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch.
185(c), §§ 1, 16 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
'2 CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 110(o) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 818
(1965).
" MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 185C, § 2 (Michie[Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
-5 Id. §§ 2, 56.
40 Id, § 3.
1981l
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assaulted in the course of an inspection, theoretically his assailant could
be prosecuted in the Housing Court Department for that crime.47 While
such a possibility is not readily apparent from the terms of the
Cleveland Housing Court Act,48 the ability to hear cases of this nature
could raise the level of respect given to the Cleveland Court. Similar to
Massachusetts are the Connecticut and New York Acts which also pro-
vide for greater jurisdictional power that that of their Cleveland
counterpart.49
This jurisdictional ability to hear cases on a variety of housing mat-
ters is a key to the effectiveness of housing courts. The Massachusetts
Act, in particular, allows for greater flexibility with regard to actions
which can be brought in the Housing Court Department. Section 20 of
the Massachusetts Act provides that:
Any civil action within the jurisdiction of the housing court
department which is pending in another court department may
be transferred to the housing court department by any party
thereto, but no civil action originally entered in the housing
court department shall be transferred to any other
department."
This provision of the Massachusetts system has the effect of allowing
any party to transfer and keep actions pending before the more ex-
perienced and possibly more equitable forum of the Housing Court.
This approach is to be contrasted with that of the Cleveland Housing
Court Act, which provides that only "upon the institution" of the Hous-
ing Court will a case filed in another division of the Cleveland Municipal
Court be assigned to the Housing Court Judge." Thus, no matter how
meritorious a case might be, if a Housing Court Judge is disinclined to
take it, it will not be transferred to the Housing Court. The result is
47 Id
48 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.181 (Page Supp. 1980).
, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47a-68, 70 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. CITY CIv. CT.
ACT § 110(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 195C, § 20 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
Massachusetts does provide for an exception to this increased jurisdiction in that
"the supreme judicial court may direct any cause pending in the housing court
department to be transferred in whole or in part for further action or directions,
and in cases of partial transfer may issue such orders or direction in regard to
the part of such cause not so transferred as justice may require." Id Also, when
cross actions between the same parties or two or more actions arising out of or
connected with the same housing accommodation are pending, or when one or
more actions in the housing court department or other courts such as the district
court or the probate and family court are outstanding, the administrative judge
may order that the action pending in such other courts be transferred to the hous-
ing court department. Such actions shall thereafter proceed in the housing court
department as though originally entered therein. Id
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.041 (Page Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 30:41
CLEVELAND HOUSING COURT ACT
that this provision may keep cases off the Court's docket. Additionally,
even if the Housing Court decides to take a case pending in another
court, such reassignment will only take place "if the administrative
judge determines that reassignment will not delay the trial of the case"
and "is in the best interest of the parties."52 Clearly, in potential Hous-
ing Court litigation, a recalcitrant housing code violator may not have
the same "interest" as the party making claims against him, and conse-
quently may fight the transfer of such a case to the Housing Court.
Most importantly, the Cleveland Housing Court Act does not make clear
whether a party can transfer out to the regular session of the municipal
court. 3 If such transfer is possible, it would authorize avoidance of the
Housing Court and present major questions as to the court's necessity.
While the Massachusetts Act is like the Cleveland ordinance in some
ways, the power of the Massachusetts Housing Court Department
seems to be clearly superior because of its broader jurisdictional power
and its greater ability to keep competing parties before it. The limited
appellate jurisdiction of the Connecticut model has similar advantages
over the Cleveland system. 4
VI. CRITERIA FOR A VIABLE HOUSING COURT IN CLEVELAND
A key to the effectiveness of any court is its ability to command and
deserve the respect of the citizens it serves. This respect results from
the strength of the judiciary, adequate funding to allow proper function-
ing of the court and the speed and effectiveness with which the court
distributes justice. The new Cleveland Court, to be a powerful and mo-
tivating force in the Cleveland housing market, must incorporate these
requirements as permitted by the legislature, to determine all housing
related matters. Unfortunately, there is concern that these essentials
are not presently possessed by the new court.
A. Money and Staffing
Cleveland City Council is charged with supplying "suitable accom-
modations" for the Housing Court.5 Concomitant with this duty, the
Council also provides for the compensation of all housing court em-
ployees other than the judge. The Council must also provide "such other
ordinary or extraordinary expenses as it considers advisable or neces-
sary for the proper operation of the court. ' 56
Clearly, City Council has complete discretion in determining what
52 I
' Id The Massachusetts Act makes it clear that this option is available. See
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 185(c), § 20 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47(a)-70(a) (West Supp. 1981).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1901.36(B) (Page Supp. 1980).
Id § 1901.36(A).
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funding will be provided for the Housing Court. Before its inception,
start-up costs of the Court approximated $100,000."7 The Cleveland City
Council, however, appropriated $50,000 for the Court. While City Coun-
cil must allocate funds necessary to facilitate the administration of
justice in its municipal court, it is not required to allocate all the funds
sought." Moreover, there has also been inquiry over whether the funds
to finance the Court's operation are to come from the city general fund,
or a more temporary source like federal community development
money. Additionally, the Court originally felt it needed fourteen
employees."0 At this writing, the Court has no more than five, including
the judge and his bailiff, due to the absence of adequate funding.
Political squabbling as well as the general fiscal problems of the city
make unrealistic a rise in the amount of funds allocated to the Housing
Court in the near future. As long as staffing and funding of the Housing
Court continue to be treated as political footballs, its future operation
cannot hope to be less than erratic. These problems contribute to the
difficulties of defining the Court's role and, if unresolved, will
significantly erode respect for this new forum before it has a chance to
succeed.
B. Speed and Effectiveness of Cleveland
Housing Court Determinations
The time between the initial issuance of a code violation notice and
compliance can often be long and drawn out process. The procedure
under the Cleveland Building Code begins with an inspection. Upon the
finding of a violation, the inspector provides the owner, agent or person
in control of the building with a written notice.6 The person served is
given a stated period of time, usually thirty days, to comply. If the per-
son sought cannot be served personally, mail service is attempted.2
This procedure may add an additional thirty days to the process. If the
alleged violator is finally found he will typically be given thirty to nine-
ty days to comply. If at the end of the ninety days he is still not in com-
pliance, he may either be given more time or his file turned over to the
City's Law Department. The Law Department investigation may take
from thirty to sixty days before the violator is brought before the Hous-
11 See Andrzejewski, Cloud Hangs Over Housing Court Already, The Plain
Dealer, Feb. 24, 1980, A35, col. 4.
11 State ex reL Clev. Municipal Court v. City of Clev. Council, 34 Ohio St.2d
120, 196 N.E.2d 544 (1973).
, See note 57 supra.
60 Id
61 CLEV., OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 13, § 3103.08(C)(1) (April 12, 1973).
62 Id. § 3103.08(C)(2).
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ing Court. This scenario is not unusual. Typically a person does not face
the Housing Court until approximately one year from the date of issu-
ance of the initial violation notice. Because of the already overcrowded
Housing Court docket, existing violations may not be remedied until
almost two years after the first violation notice is issued.
Other jurisdictions have sought to remedy this time delay problem by
permitting direct access to the Housing Court." In Massachusetts, since
the holding in Commonwealth v. Haddad," individual citizens can
bypass the law department and file code violations directly with the
Housing Court. Haddad involved a complaint by an inspector for a
neighborhood association against a property owner for violations of the
Massachusetts State Sanitary Code. The City of Boston Housing Court
found the defendant guilty of code violations, but nevertheless re-
quested the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to answer the
question whether a private citizen could pursue such an action. The
state Supreme Court held: (1) complaints under the State Sanitary Code
could be brought by interested parties other than a city or state inspec-
tor; and (2) neither the Boston Commissioner of Housing Inspection nor
the State Department of Public Health had the exclusive right to bring
criminal complaints for such violations. The court reasoned that:
[Alnyone may make a criminal complaint in a District Court who
is competent to make oath to it. General statutes imposing a du-
ty to prosecute on particular public officials are read as direc-
tory only, and do not exclude the right of any other citizen to
enter complaints for violations of the law."
Applying the reasoning of Haddad might allow the Cleveland Housing
Court to expedite the process of bringing homes into compliance with
Cleveland's housing codes. Making available such direct private citizen
action would be advantageous, as it aids in speeding the prosecution of
violators, as well as assisting in establishing the Court as a positive
force in the community. This is a step which should be made part of
' At some of the neighborhood meetings held throughout the city in an at-
tempt to get community input into how the Housing Court should be run, there
was at least one suggestion that inspectors file code violations directly with the
Housing Court as opposed to filing through the Law Department. Presently
there are no provisions in the Act or in the City of Cleveland Ordinances to allow
a private citizen to pursue such actions. At this time all code violations are pros-
ecuted by a member of the Law Department staff. See note 27 supra.
364 Mass. 795, 308 N.E.2d 899 (1975).
SId. Note that in Massachusetts, under these circumstances, the jurisdiction
of the Housing Court Department is concurrent with the district courts. See
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 185, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). Such procedure
would likely strengthen the court, assuming the problems of malicious filing of
complaints and private citizen ignorance of what constitutes a violation can be
solved.
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Housing Court procedure, as it would make the Court more useful and
effective by aiding citizen access to it.6
C. Administrative Appeals
There is concern as to how successful the court will be in effectuating
compliance with Cleveland's housing codes. Because the Housing Court
lacks appellate jurisdiction, the clever advocate can circumvent or com-
pletely ignore its reach. This limited scope of review dilutes the Hous-
ing Court's power and is another obstacle to its efficacy.
Some of this lost strength seems to be regained by virtue of section
1901.181 of the Ohio Revised Code, which gives the Housing Court "ex-
clusive jurisdiction" in civil and criminal actions to enforce Cleveland's
building and health and safety codes. An investigation of the procedure
for the enforcement of these codes, however, indicates that the Housing
Court's jurisdiction may, in some cases, be ephemeral. For example, the
Cleveland City Charter provides for the establishment of administrative
boards by the Mayor.67 The Charter itself establishes a Board of
Building Standards and Building Appeals"8 whose members are ap-
pointed by the Mayor.69 Also, the Codified Ordinances of the City of
Cleveland give the Commissioner of Housing the power to enforce the
Housing Code."0 If a person notified of a violation "fails, neglects or
refuses to comply," the Commissioner may issue a notice ordering the
premises to be vacated or "he may advise the Director of Law of the cir-
cumstances and request the Director to institute an appropriate action
at law to compel a compliance, or both."71 Unquestionably the Housing
Court Act contemplates that the "appropriate action" of the Director of
Law should commence in the Housing Court. But the mere presence of
these options is another way in which Housing Court involvement, in
matters for which it was created, may be defeated.
If the administrative option is taken, and a violation found, subse-
6 Whether such procedure is wise or warranted, however, depends on many
variables; one major variable is possible City Law Department opposition.
67 CLEV., OHIO, CHARTER ch. 11, § 70 (Nov. 9, 1931).
- Id. § 76-6.
69 Id. § 76-6(c).
70 Id § 367.04(a). Section 367.04(a) of the Cleveland Housing Code declares
that:
[Wjhenever the Commissioner of Housing shall find any dwelling struc-
ture, or premises, or any part thereof, to be in violation of the provisions
of this Housing Code, he shall give or cause to be given to the owner or
agent or person in charge of such structure of premises, and the mort-
gage of record, a written notice stating the violation therein. Such notice
shall order the owner within a stated reasonable time to repair, improve
or demolish the structure or premises concerned.
71 Id § 365.05(a).
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quent failure to comply may still not result in the case being brought
before the Housing Court. Notices of the Commissioner of Housing can
be appealed therefrom."2 The Codified Ordinances give the Board of
Building Standards and Building Appeals the right to decide appeals
from the Commissioner's notices. 3 Ideally, it would seem that the
adverse determination by the appropriate board, if not agreed to by the
claimant, should then be sent to the Housing Court for further disposi-
tion. The administrative appeals procedure embodied in the Ohio Revised
Code, however, may take the determination of appeals of such board ac-
tion out of the hands of the Housing Court. 4 The availability of these
various administrative remedies and their appeal procedures substan-
tially limits the ability of the Housing Court to provide the single,
decisive solution to Cleveland's housing problems. Allowing ad-
ministrative appeals directly to another administrative agency or to the
Court of Common Pleas results in dilution of the strength of the new
Housing Court. Certainly this situation is unlikely to change soon since
it is doubtful that the Ohio General Assembly will confer appellate
jurisdiction on a municipal court in any area. However, this limitation in
strength may be remedied without legislative action if the Court of
72 Id. § 367.09.
73 Id
7 The Charter of the City of Cleveland is silent on the question of whether
decisions of the Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals or the Board
of Zoning. Appeals are appealable. Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code,
however, sets up a procedure for the appeal from adverse administrative agency
decisions. Section 2506.06 of the Chapter reads, in part:
Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal,
authority, board, bureau, commission, department or other division of
any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the common
pleas court of the county in which the principal office of the political sub-
division is located, as provided in sections 2505.01 to 2505.45, inclusive of
the Revised Code, and as such procedure is modified by section 2506.01
to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506.06 (Page Supp. 1980). With regard to this statute it
has been written:
Ohio's Supreme Court has pointed out that Chapter 2506 was enacted by
the Ohio General Assembly largely to adequately accommodate the
growing volume of zoning and building litigation confronting our courts
and arising from adversary proceedings in respect to the interpretation
and administration of urban and rural zoning and building ordinances ....
So long as a quasi-judicial, as opposed to either a purely legislative or
purely administrative function, is being performed, the common pleas
court is authorized to hear the matter on appeal according to a statutorily
defined procedure.
Robiner, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506-Judicial Review of Administrative
Rulings, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 229, 230 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
The Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County has already held that
determinations by Cleveland's Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals
can be appealed to it. See Box v. Clev. Bd. of Bldg. Standards and Bldg. Appeals,
15 Ohio Misc. 17, 43 Ohio Op. 2d 143 (1968).
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Common Pleas is consistent in striking down at least the more specious
appeals which have delaying action as their purpose. Such appeals may
thereafter dwindle, and the Housing Court will then be free to go about
the work designed for it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cleveland, as other cities, has established a court to specifically deal
with housing problems. Despite the presence of this new Housing Court,
it is clear that many of Cleveland's housing-related problems will not
soon disappear. The agencies charged with assisting in remedying the
proliferation of substandard housing surely are overworked and under-
staffed;"5 additionally, many of those persons whom they would seek to
have comply with city housing-related laws are not in a position which
enables them to do so.76
The Housing Court needs a predictable source of funds and staffing.
This will only result when political bickering over the Court's status and
the problems of city budget constraints are resolved. The Housing
Court needs continuity, as well as the experience and strength that
results from it. The Housing Court needs to process more code viola-
tions. Currently, code violation cases account for less than ten percent
of the Housing Court docket. If this is because more homeowners are
bringing their premises into compliance voluntarily, or because com-
pliance is being secured prior to the case going before the Housing
Court, it is all to the good. If, however, such a small percentage of cases
is being prosecuted either because the system is not equipped to handle
more, or all those charged with securing housing and building code com-
pliance are not doing their jobs, then there will be a continuing problem.
Finally, the Housing Court needs a chance. A court of its type is a
genuinely unique idea throughout this country and a specifically unique
concept in this state. It can serve a role in the battle for better housing,
but it must be given time to grow. Given such time it will, hopefully,
grow intelligently.
" Two basic factors often hamper the effectiveness of the municipal de-
partment or agency charged with the enforcement of housing codes. The
first of such factors is the lack of a large enough staff to administer and
enforce the code. If the size of the staff is adequate, municipal budgetary
limitations may prohibit the payment of salaries which will attract
highly experienced and qualified personnel. In most cases, the law of the
municipality requires a minimum of work experience for an inspector.
Committee, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 550, 571 (1971).
" Nor will excessive standards cure the ills which plague the mass dwell-
ing houses of the inner city, for in their vigor to find the remedy, the
housing officials may unwittingly become overzealously oppressive, driv-
ing the landlord, overburdened by the excesses of an unrealistically
stringent housing code, right out of the market.
Note, Covenant of Habitability and the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation, 23
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539, 551 (1974).
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